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Universalism and the (un)translatable
John McKeane
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ABSTRACT
A unified set of questions arises in translation theory as it does in
philosophy: how can one particularity be related to another? Can
any general truth emerge from this relationship? And if so, in
what particular language might this general truth be thought
about and discussed? This article explores how various French
thinkers have addressed these questions, from Alain Badiou’s
recent account of philosophical French in terms of universalism, to
Antoine Berman’s and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s readings of an
alternative approach to universalism provided by German
thought. Where a key passage in Badiou’s text suggests that he
has Friedrich Hölderlin in mind, this poet-translator provides an





Something must be happening or must have
happened to the diaphanous purity of [philosophical
discourse’s universality] (Derrida 1982, 112; trans. mod.).
A unified set of questions arises in translation theory as it does in philosophy: how can one
particularity be related to another? Can any general truth emerge from this relationship?
And if so, in what particular language might this general truth be thought about and
discussed?
The Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: Dictionnaire des intraduisibles (Cassin
2004) is animated by such questions. On the one hand, it counters the market-driven dom-
inance of “globish” by insisting on linguistic singularity or difference, and by foreground-
ing particular terms as “untranslatables” (something amplified by the title of the American
version, theDictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon [Apter et al. 2014]). On
the other hand, it presents itself both as a European project and a philosophical one – two
paradigms that rely on transfer, exchange, a move beyond particularity; in short, on trans-
lation. From the perspective of this European, philosophical side of the project there would
be a danger in opposing globish by vacating the ground of generality and retreating onto
that of fragmented particularism and untranslatability. Indeed, the Vocabulaire’s editor
Barbara Cassin has more recently written that “[t]he entire undertaking of the Dictionary
goes against this tendency to make the ‘Untranslatable’ sacred […], a fault reflecting that
of universalist disdain” (Cassin 2016).1 This is to say that while we must remember that
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untranslatables exist, we must also keep them as a pluralized gathering of untranslatables
rather than a disempowering category of the Untranslatable. We must keep on translating,
even as we accept that translation is necessarily imperfect, that it is an art of compromise
and betweenness, an activity coloured in shades of grey.
Inwhat followswe shall explore the receptionof the translationsofGreek tragedyproduced
by Friedrich Hölderlin, which are often cited as major examples of the limitations of trans-
lation, which is to say as examples of untranslatability or even of untranslation.2 Our particu-
lar focus will be on French thought, particularly Antoine Berman’s and Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe’s reception of Hölderlin, and the nuanced accounts of the relation between univers-
alism and the (un)translatable that emerge from this reception. But in order to set Berman’s
and Lacoue-Labarthe’s accounts in context, we will begin by looking at an Alain Badiou text
on the French language and its association with philosophy. This text puts forward a very
different view of universalism to that of Berman and Lacoue-Labarthe, but – I shall argue –
also relies on a reading of Hölderlin’s (in)famous translations.
Universalist particularism: Alain Badiou
French thought is at issue in discussions of universalism and the (un)translatable due to
France’s own universalist heritage, on the one hand, and, on the other, the new univers-
alism of globish and the marketization of the global and European economy. But it is also
at issue because since the Enlightenment many prominent strands within this intellectual
tradition have laid claim to a different universalism, not one based on marketization and
general equivalence, but on a language of clarity allowing for the affirmation of philoso-
phical truths and the defence of human rights. Antoine de Rivarol’s work On the Univers-
ality of the French Language (1784) made this argument, which it expressed in simple
fashion: “what is not clear is not French” (cited in Hazareesingh 2016, 7).3 It could be
seen to proceed from here that the influence of French around the world was less due
to economic, military or colonial power than to the inherent nature of the language
itself. Its drive to clarity broke down obscurantism, placed fewer barriers in the way of
understanding than other languages, and thus allowed for the expression of the most
general or universal truths (for instance, concerning human rights).4
Whether such claims appear to us as quaint or alarming, or both, they cast a striking
light on Alain Badiou’s (2014) article on French in the Dictionary of Untranslatables. In
this entry, Badiou presents French as being particularly suited to the aspirations of phil-
osophy, namely the aspirations to establish general or universal truths. It seems fair to
characterize this paradoxical position as that of a universalist particularism and therefore
as one that risks failing to convince with its claims to universality, instead being explain-
able within a theory of untranslatables: the particularity of French would make it just one
more untranslatable, its global reach notwithstanding. Let us look at Badiou’s text in order
to support this characterization of his thinking in it.
The dictionary entry begins by stating, implicitly contra Rivarol, that the characteristics
of French under discussion are not due to any inherent linguistic quality, but instead due
to the political and philosophical heritage carried by the French language:
the privilege given to French does not derive from any intrinsic character of the language, but
instead from the possibility of a universal and democratic philosophical communication. A
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language of women and the working class rather than of scientists, philosophical French
relies on the belief that the act of thinking is open to everyone. (Badiou 2014, 349)
French is said to allow for modes of communication that are anti-elitist, transparent and
open to all. There is an admirable desire here to steer clear of attributing these positive
universal, democratic characteristics to any essence, nature or genius of the language:
these benefits were not caused by linguistic determinism, but rather by real struggles in
the contingent world. The French language seems to act as something akin to a cultural
memory, a repository unable to positively create characteristics, but instead serving to
retain them passively, to reflect the political and philosophical discourse of the past,
and act as a brake on any radical alterations of that discourse made by the present.5
Thus it is hard to free ourselves of the suspicion that in this instance Badiou’s argument
is a culturally conservative one, even if it is based on liberal values agreeable to many. His
argument seems to be that French acts as a cultural repository, storing up legitimacy over
time; such conservatism is hard to reconcile with views of liberal values as those which
disrupt orthodoxy and its established mantras.6
If French thus appears to feature as part of an argument for the continued relevance of
enlightened, democratic values, we might imagine that the implied countervailing force is
that of globish and the destabilizing forces of the market economy. But in truth, when
Badiou’s text addresses English, the language most associated with Anglo-Saxon market-
ization, it is not in terms of its simplified offspring, globish. Instead, Badiou’s interest in
English concerns its rich lexis –wemight imagine that he has in mind the shared Latin and
Germanic sources of much English vocabulary, not to mention the variety of expression
seen in Shakespeare. Thus, writing comparatively about French, he downplays the impor-
tance of breadth, vivacity or colour:
Unlike English, [French] is not a language of the phenomenon, of nuance, of descriptive
subtlety. Its semantic field is narrow; abstraction is natural to it. Accordingly, neither empiri-
cism nor even phenomenology suit it. It is a language of decision, of principle and conse-
quence. (Badiou 2014, 351)
WhereEnglish is presented as allowing for nuance and subtlety, breadth and variation, French
is said to concentrate on a narrower range. It applies a series of formal rules – decision, prin-
ciple, consequence – rather than allowing space for uncertainty or multifariousness.7 One
might have thought that the more broadly based one’s vocabulary, the higher (as it were)
the abstractions that one would have been able to build upon it. For Badiou, however, such
variety in English provides too distracting, it scrambles and overwhelms the formal philoso-
phical principles that French is better able to hold on to. On this view, the local colour allowed
by English inhibits the functioning of the wider rational system.
As French thus begins to be painted as the philosophical language, Badiou turns to deal
with German thought, especially in its relation to language. This comparison will allow
French to be depicted as always already sympathetic to political philosophy, and as privi-
leging clarity over ambiguity, freedom over determinism. Badiou writes that
[a]gainst a fascination with words and etymology, that is, with origin and substance, French
sets the primacy of syntax, that is, of relation and assertion. This is why, once again, philos-
ophy in French is political: between axioms and sentences, against consensus and ambiguity,
French plants its certainty and its authority, which are also the source of its persuasive beauty.
(Badiou 2014, 349)
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Here the implied contrast seems to be with German and more specifically with philoso-
phical German which, under the influence of Martin Heidegger’s concern for etymology,
provides many of the terms forming the currency of continental philosophy (to take a
small sample from the Dictionary of Untranslatables: Dasein, Ereignis, Sorge). As he
goes on to say, “nothing managed to impel philosophy in France toward the hard
German labor of opening words up, deriving their Indo-European roots, entreating
them to mean ‘being’ or ‘community’ ” (Badiou 2014, 351). If German is the primary phi-
losophical other in Badiou’s mind (and German thought’s huge influence on post-World
War II French philosophy would suggest as much), this implied other to French as a phi-
losophical language is painted as being unreactive, as rooted to its origin, as formed of a
heavy, immobile substance. It could be argued that these are so many ways of describing a
language rooted to singularities and particularisms, one ill-suited to the movement and
exchange of philosophical generalization. French by contrast is said to privilege syntax,
which is to say that it sets particular words in a general structure; it relates these particu-
larities to one another, in a way recalling the way that philosophy provides a general fra-
mework weighing and assessing the individual truth-claims. What Badiou depicts as
French’s leaning towards political philosophy situates it clearly in the debate over transla-
tables and untranslatables: the model of generalized, rational, free exchange places the
French tradition firmly on the side of translatability. While Badiou’s generalizations are
problematic when assessed as truth-claims, there is also a sense in which the less convin-
cing they are in such terms, the more interesting they become. These generalizations about
generalization stand in for French philosophy’s tendency to synthesize, and inscribe
Badiou in a broader tradition of Republicanism that a major and politically radical
figure such as he might instead have been expected to critique.8
In contrast to both English and German, two languages that strongly influence and
compete with French in differing domains (commerce and philosophy), Badiou therefore
presents and valorizes certain capacities of the French language. Over and against broad
lexis and strong etymology, this language is said to prefer abstraction, syntax, and to
allow for so many movements towards the general or the universal. As the dictionary
entry moves towards its end, Badiou comes to concentrate on the importance of
maxims, aphorisms or pensées.9 He writes that
[w]hat French offers philosophy that is universal in character is always in the form of some-
what stiff maxims or badly nuanced derivations. Again, the latent style is that of a speech that
aims to make an assembly, seduced, vote for someone without examining the details too
much. One must accept this strength, or weakness. It enters into the composition of
eternal philosophy, like that which, from the Greek source, retains mathematics rather
than mythology, litigation rather than elegy, sophistical argumentation rather than prophetic
utterance, democratic politics rather than tragic caesura. (Badiou 2014, 354)
Here Badiou is pursuing the line that we saw above, namely that French philosophy, due to
the particular history of that philosophy and its important role in society, retains a political
function. If French philosophy produces maxims – Badiou quotes amongst others Sartre’s
“man is a useless passion” (354) – it is because they are an effective way of communicating
a philosophical position in a non-specialist discourse, to wider society. The contingent,
particular history of French is presented as having given it this universalizing function
or aspiration. It acts not as a specific set of values, but rather as a kind of accelerant,
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capable of more effectively communicating whatever one might be arguing for. Or rather
than an accelerant, we can take Badiou’s description of “French as a thin language” (351).
The thinness or non-viscosity of this language means that it can be used to bring views into
a philosophical arena that is shared, public, as well as unable or unwilling to deal with
tough singularities resisting this fluid process of communication. In order to do so, philo-
sophical French – as it were – thins or dilutes the ideas in question; this is a mechanism of
compromise allowing for naturalization within a particular, accepted discourse. We can
surely better understand the process being described by thinking of translation theory,
with its sensitivity to naturalization and foreignization – and the comparison with
Berman’s and Lacoue-Labarthe’s thinking, below, will enable us to do this. We can also
note that something specific is at work in Badiou: he finishes the passage quoted by exclud-
ing a series of others – “mythology”, “elegy”, “prophetic utterance”, “tragic caesura”. These
exclusions seem to have had in mind a particular model of translation, a particular
relationship to universalism, and a particular philosophical and literary figure: Friedrich
Hölderlin.
Universalism and translatability: Antoine Berman
Before we come to look at the particular, Hölderlinian context of the way Badiou character-
izes philosophical French, let us consider that Hölderlin plays an important role in the
debate around universalism and (un)translatability in other areas of late-twentieth-
century French thought. A key intervention here is that of Antoine Berman’s Experience
of the Foreign: Culture andTranslation inRomanticGermany, which bears as its second sub-
title the names of the major figures it explores: Herder, Goethe, Schlegel, Novalis, Hum-
boldt, Schleiermacher, Hölderlin.10 On one level, this work gives an account of a model
of universalism rivalling the French one.11 But beyond this, it has been highly influential
because it has provided a major argument against the naturalizing school of translation.
Its sheer ambition helps it to do so: it argues that foreignizing, altering, stretching language
is not the task of translation alone, but that of literature in general. We read as follows:
[T]hat a translation that “smacks” of translation should be considered bad is a contradiction
which overlooks that the writing of a translation is an irreducible mode of writing: a writing
that welcomes the writing of another language in its own writing, and that cannot, lest it be an
imposture, suppress the fact that it is this operation. We should even go further, and say that
in all literary writing there is always a trace of such a relation. Just like in our speech, as
Bakhtin says, there is always the speech of the other, and just like this interlacing of two
speeches constitutes the horizon of translation (and this, in a profound way, is the
meaning of Goethe’s Weltliteratur), it is absurd to demand that a translation appear as a
“pure” writing – which is itself a myth. (Berman 225)
In other words, there can be no division between translated or impure language on the one
hand, and untranslated or pure language on the other, because no such pure language
exists. There is always heterogeneity, multiplicity, difference, even within what were
more traditionally considered single traditions (and all the more so in the case of
major, mature literary traditions). “Pure” writing or language, the direct, formless,
language also claimed to exist by universalist philosophy, is presented here as being a
myth. Already we are at a great distance from Badiou’s sharp and clear distinctions
between French, English and German as languages and traditions of thought.
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It is nonetheless striking that Berman arrives at this conclusion in a work based on a
period in German writing and thought that placed great importance on the universal.
Rather than a universalism that values clarity and therefore tends towards naturalization
(as in the account of French given by Badiou), this universalism would be one based in
cultural receptivity, and more particularly translation. In other words, the argument is
that the absence of any great past or tradition is what forced German writers to undertake
translations, and is what made German the ideal vehicle for the literature and philosophy
of the modern age. Berman quotes Goethe’s statement:
Soon other nations will learn German, because they will realize that in this way they can to a
large extent save themselves the apprenticeship of almost all other languages. Indeed, from
what languages do we not possess the best works in the most eminent translations? (11–12)
In other words, translation into German, when coupled with the learning of German by
other nations, serves relatively straightforwardly as a way of accessing the breadth of cul-
tural productions from across the world (in short, would German be simply a technology
setting information free – the internet of its day?). The objection can of course be made:
why should one particular language, rather than any other, be the voice of universalism?
To this it might be responded first that the concern for the universal here is more receptive
than the French one as outlined by Badiou, not requiring the same naturalization. And
secondly, there is the broader argument that the most obvious alternative to universalism
– a fragmented world lacking in communication – is not attractive.
Berman continues to unpack such arguments by turning to the notions of translatabil-
ity and untranslatability.12 Taking one of the most famous examples of the translation
practice broached by the Goethe statement above, he discusses the versions of Shakespeare
produced by A.W. Schlegel, and quotes the letter to the translator by fellow Romantic
Novalis in which the latter declares that “I am convinced that the German Shakespeare
today is better than the English” (105). Berman addresses the argument that this is
simply a nationalist game of one-upmanship, the victory of German being all the
sweeter because it concerns the most canonical of English authors. “Is it a judgment of
the ‘nationalist’ type. Certainly not, since the Germanness mentioned in the letter, as
for Herder, Goethe, and Schleiermacher, is above all conceived by the capacity of translat-
ing” (106). In other words, the success or superiority of these translated plays is not down
to the fact that they are German translations, but rather because they are German trans-
lations. The German tradition does not seek to stand out from those of other nations, but
rather takes on the higher or universal task of bringing something extra to the work in
question.
This something extra is defined through Berman’s reading of the notion of Bildung. He
writes:
Through Bildung an individual, a people, a nation, but also a language, a literature, a work of
art in general are formed and thus acquire a form, a Bild. Bildung is always a movement
toward a form, one’s own form – which is to say that, in the beginning, every being is deprived
of its form. (43–44; emphases original)
This is a notion applicable at once to individuals, nations and works of art (and the
thinking in question sees the three as developing in mutually reliant ways). Self-identity
is not a given at the outset, but something that is arrived at through a process involving
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– in the case of the individual – experiences of otherness (romantic love, travel, or the
two combined), or – in the case of the work of art – modes of reception such as criti-
cism and translation. These various processes lead to dynamic self-fulfilment (rather
than inert self-identity), they lead one to become what one is. We might name these
aspects, albeit awkwardly, as receivability, criticizability and translatability; let us look
further at the latter, in line with our current investigation. Berman writes that for
German Romanticism, “[t]he work is that linguistic production which calls for trans-
lation as a destiny of its own. Let us provisionally name this call translatability” (126;
emphasis original). The possibility of openness and exchange is painted as having
been crucial for these early generations of Romantics, before the debate switched
round, and the ineffability of personal experience became dominant for later Romantics.
This shift in the debate is addressed as follows:
[T]his strange destiny by which those who affirmed the a priori translatability of literature
gave birth to a poetics of untranslatability, a far less innocent poetics than it appears to be
at first sight, since in the final analysis it can only be a regressive poetics of the incommunic-
able. (120; emphases original)
It is notable that Berman does more than describe the shift in the debate, he labels it as
regressive. It is as if the incommunicable and the untranslatable are not only the opposite
of the communicable and the translatable, not simply categories reserved for empirically
recalcitrant material, but instead ones that reveal an ideological resistance to exchange and
openness. By describing the poetics of the incommunicable and the untranslatable as
regressive, Berman suggests that such notions inherently belong to an earlier stage of
the debate, that their fate is always to be overcome by the implicitly progressive forces
of communication and translation. Here there is some proximity to the arguments of
Badiou explored above; to state that the untranslatable and the incommunicable are
regressive imply that a model of generalization, universality and therefore translatability
would be preferable. However, Badiou and Berman differ insofar as the former explicitly
excludes Hölderlin from his account of French philosophical discourse, whereas the latter,
although the aim of his book is not to characterize this discourse, relies on Hölderlin as he
argues that all writing is impure and polyphonic.
The second generation of Romantics mentioned by Berman clearly interests him less
than the first. But even amongst the seven authors cited in his subtitle, there are clear
divergences – whether of generation (Herder and Goethe being 20–25 years older than
the others), or of community (the central group of Jena Romantics does not include
their contemporary Hölderlin). But whilst Hölderlin is somewhat marginal in terms of
the groupings, he is central to Berman’s work. Indeed, its title is taken from one part of
Heidegger’s two-part reading of Hölderlin’s poem “Remembrance”: for the philosopher,
the experience of the foreign contributed, alongside the learning of what is one’s own
(or proper), to the process of Bildung (Berman 160). There are obvious political reasons
why the notions of own-most-ness or proper-ness raised by Heidegger are unpalatable,
and Berman’s intervention transposes these questions into the realm of translation: natur-
alizing translation thus easily becomes an expression of linguistic nationalism. In the case
of the process of Bildung carried out by experiencing the foreign, Berman argues that Höl-
derlin in fact interrupts a model applicable in the case of the other writers with whom he is
grouped in The Experience of the Foreign (Herder, Goethe, Schlegel, Novalis, Humboldt,
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Schleiermacher). Although the work culminates in a chapter on Hölderlin, he – paradoxi-
cally – displaces what has been a dominant schema throughout it. In Berman’s words,
the movement of leaving and returning to itself of Spirit, as it is defined by Schelling and
Hegel, but also by F. Schlegel, as we have seen, is also the speculative reformulation of the
law of classical Bildung: what is one’s own gains access to itself only through experience,
namely the experience of the foreign. This experience may be the Reise, the romantic
journey of Henrich von Ofterdingen, at the end of which what is one’s own and what is
foreign discover their poetic identity, or the Apprenticeship Years of Wilhlem Meister,
during which Wilhelm slowly discovers the virtues of self-limitation, far from the attacks
of the “demonic”.
Hölderlin’s thinking does not depend on either of these two laws; its complexity bursts the
simplicity of the schema of Bildung: It is neither the apprenticeship of the infinite, nor of
the finite. (162; emphases original)
There is no doubt that Hölderlin does experience the foreign: in travelling to Bordeaux in
1801–02, in undergoing the power of elemental sunlight, in communing with Greek
culture through his readings and translations of Sophoclean tragedy. However, he is
said to be radically different from the other figures discussed insofar as he does not
make anything of this experience, does not put it to use by means of any greater knowledge
of himself.13 His experience of the foreign is indeed as an untranslatable, as something not
translated back into comprehensible terms, not explained away. This way of relating to
otherness has been influential and represents a distinct move away from the universalism
seen in Badiou’s argument (there remain problems with this apparently more ethical
approach, nonetheless).14 Let us now turn to our third and final section, in which a
subtly different account of Hölderlin, universalism and (un)translatability is given by Phi-
lippe Lacoue-Labarthe.
Mimetic universalism: Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe
We have already seen that Badiou in his account of French philosophical language
describes it as “that which, from the Greek source, retains mathematics rather than
mythology, litigation rather than elegy, sophistical argumentation rather than prophetic
utterance, democratic politics rather than tragic caesura” (354). The reference to “elegy”
can be seen as reacting to German thinkers’ (not least Heidegger) narratives of Dichten
und Denken, and perhaps to the poet featuring most prominently in these narratives, Höl-
derlin.15 “Mythology”, for its part, may well be a reference to the rehabilitation of ancient
mythologies (Greek, but also Hindu and Germanic) by the early German Romantics; and
an important text in Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s critical anthology of Romanticism calls
for a new mythology of reason.16 But beyond this, as we shall now see, the mention of
“propetic utterance” and “tragic cæsura” can be tied to the account of Hölderlin given
by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and specifically that of his translations of and writing on
the tragedies of Sophocles.
The German poet’s translations of the Œdipus and the Antigone played a major role
in Lacoue-Labarthe’s career. He took the two texts, themselves translated by Hölderlin
from Greek into German, and translated them into French (Hölderlin 1998a, 1998b),
before producing stage productions of each drama. These activities were accompanied
and extended by a significant number of critical essays on various aspects of
TRANSLATION STUDIES 71
Hölderlin’s translations including their implications for philosophy and (a)theology,
the light they throw on other thinkers including Hegel and the Jena Romantics,
Nietzsche and Heidegger, as well as the accounts of Hölderlin’s so-called madness.17
In this final section, I aim to draw out the references made by Badiou and to show
how Lacoue-Labarthe’s thinking on Hölderlin’s translations opposes what I have
named the particularist universalism of Badiou’s account of philosophical French.
This opposition is more closely related to the translatable universalism that Berman
depicts emerging from German Romanticism (of which Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-
Luc Nancy [1988] edited a critical anthology, The Literary Absolute). Lacoue-Labarthe
avoids the naivety of believing that universalism could ever be expressed purely or
directly without establishing a new version of particularism. Therefore over and
against this direct or diegetic universalism, it is possible to see Lacoue-Labarthe’s pos-
ition as one of mimetic universalism: one that speaks not directly, but in and through a
series of adopted languages, discourses or masks.
Badiou’s references to “prophetic utterance” and “tragic caesura” adopt terms from
Hölderlin’s elliptical discussions of the two dramas he translated, the “Notes on the
Œdipus” and “Notes on the Antigone” (Hölderlin 2009). Hölderlin discusses each play
as if it were a poetic verse, with the Antigone being stressed in its earlier part, and the
Œdipus in its latter part. Although bearing different stresses, each drama therefore is
divided into earlier and latter parts, and in each case the division is provided by a
caesura (literally, a cutting). Lacoue-Labarthe’s work places great importance on this
figure of the caesura, seeing it as a transformative interruption, and indeed using it to
describe Hölderlin’s broader significance in relation to the philosophy of Hegel in the
essay “The Caesura of the Speculative” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998a). It seems that Badiou’s
exclusion of “tragic caesura” is a direct reference to Hölderlin’s usage (which he could
have found in the texts included in Lacoue-Labarthe’s published translations of the two
dramas). We know that in 2007, at least, he was aware of the caesura text: he refers to
it as “one of the most astonishing texts of these past decades” (Badiou 2007, 18). It thus
seems likely that in the 2004 text Badiou’s reference to “tragic caesura” is strongly deter-
mined by Lacoue-Labarthe’s reception of Hölderlin’s reception of the tragedies. And the
same can be said for the reference to “prophetic utterance”. For, returning to Hölderlin’s
Notes on the tragic plays, the caesura in each drama is said to be represented by the inter-
vention of the prophet Tiresias. As a prophet he is able to recognize and speak truths that
normal humans cannot – an inability that brings about tragic dénouements, punishing
these humans for their hubris. The divine or quasi-divine nature of these truths as they
play these determining roles in the dramas shows why these Sophoclean tragedies, trans-
lated and discussed by Hölderlin, are particularly important in understanding the Roman-
tic project of a fusion of mythology and reason.
This thinking of caesura and its various consequences is found refracted across Lacoue-
Labarthe’s œuvre – in his critical essays, translations and theatre productions. For
instance, when discussing Hölderlin’s translations, Lacoue-Labarthe uses the Hellenistic
term metaphrasis, which is presented as follows in an eponymous essay:
Metaphrasis, in ancient Greek […], means: translation. […] But other meanings are
associated with the word, thanks to the polysemy of the preposition meta: for example
what we, for our part, refer to with another term borrowed from Greek, “paraphrase”;
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or, on the basis of Latin, with “explication”. Metaphrazein means “to express in new
terms” or, generally, “to speak afterwards, following”. And the same verb […] means
“to reflect afterwards, to deliberate, to examine after mature reflection”. (Lacoue-Labarthe
1998b, 7–8)
For Hölderlin to produce a metaphrasis of Sophocles therefore means most straightfor-
wardly a translation, but also a restatement, an explanation, a paraphrase, and even –
as the final example from the passage suggests – a mature reflection based on the material
in question. This convergence of meanings in a single term allows Lacoue-Labarthe to
suggest that Hölderlin was more than the simple facilitator of Sophocles, and that his
translations have equal status to the so-called originals, being a way of restating, rethink-
ing, and thinking further than them. These translations, this “desperate and even incom-
prehensible manner of overwriting [surphraser] Sophocles” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998b, 10),
allow something to be said in a second-order way that would not be achieved by simply
writing a new text. In a similar way to the Romantic Theory explored by Berman, this
model of translation is at some distance from a paradigm of fidelity to the source text
and language. Instead the emphasis is on foreignization, but with the proviso that this
is a dynamic process, a foreignization of a target text and language, rather than simply
a replacement of them with other texts and languages (which may be foreign from one
perspective whilst also being native and self-same from their own). What is important
in terms of translatability or untranslatability for Berman and Lacoue-Labarthe is not
the destination arrived at when translation takes place, but the journey undertaken in
order to get there.
Let us recall the terrain traversed by the three thinkers Badiou, Berman and Lacoue-
Labarthe. Badiou’s article on the French language painted it as bearing a strong cultural
association to philosophy, and more specifically a political mode of philosophy. On his
account, French discourse has a commitment to generalization and the universal, which
seems to us to align with notions of translatability: to resist taking part in a general
economy of translation is to open the door to special pleading, obscurantism and pri-
vilege (etymology: private law). Thinkers of the untranslatable such as Berman and
Lacoue-Labarthe seek to counter such arguments by stating that the easy circulation
of ideas can equate to the erasure of cultural difference, and that surface universality
or equality can mask underlying, unspoken differences. We do not need to be aware
of our epistemic biases for them to be operative. Now, these two basic arguments are
relatively well known. What I have tried to show is a further stage in the debate,
where the argument for generalization and equality has been updated in a text
written in 2014 (albeit by a philosopher in his late seventies). Not only this, but it
has been updated using terms associated with the untranslatable by those such as
Berman and Lacoue-Labarthe in the context of Hölderlin and Romantic Theory:
Badiou’s use of “mythology”, “elegy” and “tragic caesura” shows as much. Should we
reject his argument as simply a return to an outdated paradigm, a conservative
moment reaffirming the importance of philosophical and political tradition? Or
should we accept its admonitions that when we affirm untranslatable cultural difference
we lose sight of the goal of generalized equality? In either case, it seems that these the-
orizations of translatability and untranslatability constantly return to political questions;
and it is by looking briefly at this aspect that we can conclude.
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Conclusion: wearing a mask
We have seen that Badiou’s Dictionary of Untranslatables entry on the French language
seeks to characterize philosophy in that language, in terms of what he argues is its
leaning towards the clarity of democratic politics. This reading excludes a certain linking
of mythology and reason present in Hölderlin’s translations of Sophocles, and is taken up
by figures such as Lacoue-Labarthe (who provided Badiou with the very terms he uses).
Let us return briefly to Badiou’s account of philosophical French, the better to then close
by seeing what Berman’s and Lacoue-Labarthe’s responses might be. Badiou states that in
French, “a basic democratic intention […] turns philosophical discourse toward discussion
and seduction” (350). As he continues later, “the reason philosophers, starting with Des-
cartes, began writing in French is one that was in their eyes political in nature” (351, empha-
sis original). Rousseau, Sartre and Lacan will all be aligned with this same reading: namely,
that the first priority in philosophical French is one located in a societal or political sphere,
the necessity to convince. Badiou confirms this when he asks:
To whom, further, is philosophy not addressed? To the learned, to the Sorbonne. Just writing
in French is not enough to prove this. One must write this “modern” French, this writer’s
French, this literary French, which is distinguished from the “academized”, or “correct”,
French transmitted in universities. (351, emphasis original)18
In such a light, the much-discussed influence of French academics on public life would
only exist insofar as, in taking part in this public life, they are altering their properly aca-
demic work. In any case, Badiou’s argument seems harmless: who would not be in favour
of democratization or pulling down barriers to entry?19
It is not philosophy’s democratic responsibilities as such that should be called into
question, but rather the notion that they must be its first priority. For an alternative phi-
losophical responsibility is that towards truth, the search for truth. If that can be done
alongside dissemination, all the better – but if dissemination becomes synonymous with
populism (not to mention a post-truth populism), then problems arise. This can be
seen when Badiou’s comments about the political responsibility that is unavoidable for
philosophical French are related to the discussions of naturalization and foreignization
familiar to translation theory. His argument implies that naturalization is best: that phi-
losophical French should always try to be understood and to seduce at all costs, i.e.
before it tries to accurately represent the nature of or the evidence concerning whatever
matter is under discussion. This is opposed to the view according to which such a trans-
lation should attempt to alter and expand the French language, even if it is at the cost of
impairing one’s ability to win whatever debate is immediately at hand. And this latter pos-
ition has closely informed that of the French thinkers we have seen drawing on the
example of Hölderlin’s translations – Berman and Lacoue-Labarthe. Rather than
arguing that there should be a single language for philosophical debate, and that that
language happens to be French (or English, or German, etc., or even formal logic or math-
ematics), their argument is based upon the notion of philosopher en langues (philosophiz-
ing in tongues or philosophizing in languages). Translations associated with this school
therefore often choose a foreignizing approach; and deconstructive writing often
chooses to emphasize linguistic patterning, wordplay and circumlocutions, to celebrate
linguistic singularity and difference. But in doing so, neither Berman nor Lacoue-Labarthe
seeks to replace the dominance of the home language and culture with a displaced or
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inverse chauvinism based on the other language and culture in question. Instead, they are
seeking to make a point that can only be made in a second-order or mimetic way: that the
search for broader, more general, more universal truth carries on, but it does so in and
through linguistic and cultural situations, rather than abstractly or directly. To repurpose
Descartes’s expression, the search for truth moves forward wearing a mask.
Notes
1. Translations are my own except where specified otherwise.
2. The translations are cited in the key texts for translation studies, Benjamin (2012, 79–83) and
Berman (1992; Benjamin’s last chapter looks at Hölderlin).
3. One of Rivarol’s arguments is that subject-verb-object constructions are particularly logical
and clear (see Cassin 2016, 215).
4. Similar claims can of course be made on behalf of English, with its relatively simple rules on
gender and morphology, for instance, being foregrounded. To these claims, similar objec-
tions about the underlying economic, military and (neo)colonial considerations can be made.
5. The past thus carried by French was of course one of nation-building and centralization. “In
his report on idioms to the Committee of Public Safety in January 1794 the Jacobin Bertrand
Barère observed, ‘Federalism and superstition speak Lower Breton, emigration and hatred of
the Republic speak German, counter-Revolution speaks Italian and fanaticism speaks
Basque.’ Lest there be any misunderstanding, he added, ‘Let us destroy these damaging
and mistaken instruments’.” Cited in Hazareesingh (2016, 180–181).
6. This conservatism surfaces in one vein of Apter’s reading of Badiou on comparativism in
relation to translation, which depicts him as making a special case for “great poems” and
as “pay[ing] little heed to linguistic class struggle” (see Apter 2006, 85, 87).
7. In making such statements Badiou is rehearsing a position, and a comparison with English,
already found in Hippolyte Taine: Translating an English sentence into French is like copying
a coloured figure with a gray pencil. Reducing aspects and qualities of things, the French
mind ends up with general ideas, simple ones, which it aligns in a simplified order, that of
logic cited in McQueeney (1987), 410.
8. It is of course paradoxical to attempt to demonstrate the existence of such a general tendency
(within French philosophical discourse) by way of individual examples. Nonetheless, let us
direct the reader towards a further association of Frenchness with freedom: Jean-Luc
Nancy’s chapter “Franchement [Frankly]” in Identité: fragments, franchises (Nancy 2010,
27–32). Here he writes that “[l]e nom ‘France’ et l’adjectif ‘français’ porteraient ainsi un
bien beau privilège: car le mot franc, comme nom du peuple et comme adjectif, a été génér-
eusement chargé des valeurs de l’indépendance, de la non-inféodation [[t]he name ‘France’
and the adjective ‘French’ can thus be seen to carry a very fine privilege: for the word frank, as
the name of a people and as an adjective, has been generously endowed with the values of
independence, of non-subservience]” (30).
9. SeeWood (2015). Here Badiou’s entry is described as “highly tendentious” (6), although the essay
has been read as an exercise in unstinting praise of Frenchness, an expression of galloping linguis-
tic chauvinism. I think it is more ironic than that, in the end something more like a comic lament
about French philosophy’s desperate commitment to epigrammatic cleverness (6).
10. This work quotes extensively from the anthology jointly edited by Lacoue-Labarthe, which
appeared in French in 1978: The Literary Absolute (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988). It
is one of the major expressions of the influence of this critical anthology.
11. Berman paints this rivalry as an explicit one at various moments; for instance, here (where
Badiou’s claim for the naturalizing tendencies of philosophical French is reflected): “At the
time when, in Germany, fidelity is being celebrated with almost marital overtones by Breitinger,
Voss, and Herder, France translates without the least concern for fidelity and continues its never-
abandoned tradition of ‘embellishing’ and ‘poeticizing’ translations. The German theory of trans-
lation consciously positions itself against these translations ‘after the French manner’” (35).
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12. The “-ability” suffix (e.g. in criticizability, translatability, reproducibility) is explored in
Weber (2008). Benjamin wrote on the same German Romantics (whether Hölderlin, or
the Jena group) as Berman and Lacoue-Labarthe; the latter alongside Anne-Marie Lang
translated Benjamin’s work on the topic as Le Concept de critique esthétique dans le roman-
tisme allemand (Benjamin 1986).
13. Such a reading glosses over the fragmentation that affected the work of Friedrich Schlegel and
Novalis, however.
14. We can note in passing that when pursued further, this argument leads to a near-celebration of
Hölderlin, with his 36 years in a diminished mental state in Tübingen and his foreignizing, literal
translations of Sophocles. There is a danger that this can exoticize his experience, celebrating suf-
fering from a safe distance, and turning him into a holy fool. For instance, the issue of madness is
given pride of place in Lacoue-Labarthe’s thinking around his two French translations of Höl-
derlin’s translations of tragedy (Hölderlin 1998a, 1998b). Derrida criticized Blanchot for assign-
ing a similar role to Hölderlin’s madness as the essence of poetry (see McKeane 2013).
15. Lacoue-Labarthe wrote the introduction to Friedrich Hölderlin, Hymnes, élégies et autres
poèmes (Hölderlin 1983, 7–20).
16. The “Oldest Systematic Programme of German Idealism” was presented by the first section
of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s L’absolu littéraire, though it was excluded from The Literary
Absolute because like many of the other texts it was already available in English. It is available
in various volumes (e.g. Behler 1987, 161–163).
17. Details and discussion of these translations, productions and critical texts can be found in
McKeane (2015), 87–108. The German translations have been translated into English by
David Constantine (see Hölderlin 2001).
18. Badiou’s definition of “literary” French here is not the one associated with high register and
convoluted syntax found in dictionaries and elsewhere. Instead it involves direct speaking or
an easy appeal to non-specialists.
19. However, the gendered aspect of it is more problematic: Badiou paints philosophy’s need to
seduce as running from René Descartes’s correspondence with the princess of Sweden up to
Jacques Lacan and beyond; “the conviction arose that philosophical discourse must be
addressed to women, that the conversation of intelligent women is a means of approval or
validation that is much more important than all the decrees of the learned” (350).
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